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DRUG REGULATION AND THE CONSTITUTION AFTER
WESTERN STATES
MargaretGilhooley *
I. INTRODUCTION

For the first time, the Supreme Court of the United States has
invalidated a provision of the federal laws governing food and
drugs1 based on the constitutional protections for commercial
speech. In Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,2 the Court
found that the First Amendment barred Congress from precluding advertising about "drug compounding" when other restrictions, such as a warning about the lack of Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") testing, provided adequate alternatives to
protect the public.' Drug compounding is the practice in which a
pharmacist produces unapproved variations of approved drugs to
meet individual needs in accordance with a physician's prescrip* Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School. B.S.Ed., Fordham University, magna cum
laude; LL.B., 1966, Columbia Law School, magna cum laude. I worked for the Office of
Chief Counsel of FDA from 1976 to 1981, and was a member of the presidentially appointed Commission on Dietary Supplement Labels, whose report is noted infra note 83.
I appreciate the research assistance of Margaret M. Buck and support from a Seton
Hall Law School summer research stipend.
1. 21 U.S.C. § 353a (2000). The provision was enacted in 1997 in the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA), Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 503A, 111 Stat. 2328,
2328 (1997).
2. 122 S. Ct. 1497 (2002).
3. Id. at 1506, 1508. The effect of the litigation has been to invalidate the entire provision that exempted pharmacy compounding from the usual drug approval requirements
since no party appealed the lower court's finding that the advertising restriction was nonseverable. The legality of compounding activity will turn on whether the specific practice
violates general provisions of the law, such as those relating to interstate commerce and
an intent to distribute a new drug. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g), 331(a), 331(k), 352(f), 355
(2001). The FDAMA provision resembles a "safe harbor" rather than a specific prohibition.
In Washington Legal Foundationv. Henney, a legislative provision that was merely a safe
harbor was found not to present a facial challenge to speech, making preenforcement review inappropriate. 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000). See Margaret Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Food and Drug Law: When Avoidance Is Right, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1383 (2002).
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tion.4 Congress barred advertisements about compounding for
specific drugs because, according to the FDA, the ads are "fair
proxy for actual or intended large-scale manufacturing" of untested drugs.5 This article examines the dispute among the Justices regarding the rigor with which the commercial speech test
announced in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York 6 is applied, and the tensions involved in reconciling stricter commercial speech protections with
the deference accorded Congress in the regulation of commercial
products. The article then turns to Western States's wider relevance to food and drug regulation, and the extent to which a disclaimer7 about the lack of FDA testing or approval might be considered a constitutionally permitted alternative to meeting
statutory requirements for FDA drug approval. Attention is given
to whether any changes in the FDA's approach to the direct-toconsumer ("DTC") advertising of prescription drugs are needed on
constitutional grounds, or alternatively on a statutory or policy
basis. The paper also explores the difficulties in developing nonmisleading disclosures for drugs that are promoted for off-label
unapproved uses, and the likely resistance to fully adequate disclosures.
II. COMMERCIAL SPEECH ANALYSIS
A. Central Hudson as Applied: The Dispute About Its Meaning
The evolving tests and growing reach of commercial speech
protections have already received extensive analysis.' In Western

4. 122 S. Ct. at 1500.
5. Id. at 1505.
6. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
7. In this article, a disclaimer refers to a statement about the lack of FDA testing or
approval, made in lieu of actually meeting the requirements for testing and approval. The
term has been used in that sense in commercial speech cases such as Pearsonv. Shalala,
164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
8. See, e.g., LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing regulation and taxation of commerce); David A. Anderson, Freedom of the
Press, 80 TEx. L. REV. 429, 480 n.275 (2002) (reporting that in the twenty-one commercial
speech cases since Central Hudson, the speech restriction was stricken in fourteen, and
suggesting that the commercial speech doctrine "reflects the rise of market ideology in
First Amendment thought"); Paul D. Carrington, Our Imperial First Amendment, 34 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1167, 1188-92 (2001) (expressing concern about extension of First Amend-
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States, the Court applied the framework set forth in Central Hudson, 9 although Justice O'Connor acknowledged the dissatisfaction
various Justices have expressed with the test.1 ° What deserves
comment here is that while the Justices use the same test, they
differ on its meaning in practice. The majority emphasized the
need for an express showing by the government about the lack of
alternative, less restrictive means of accomplishing the interest
served by the regulation.1 ' Justice Breyer's dissent was more willing to read the government's regulatory rationale broadly in ways
that serve the underlying safety aim of the statute. 2 The majority
opinion criticized the dissent as providing "hypothesized justifications" for the scheme, an inappropriate approach in dealing with
speech protections. 3 Exploring these differences involves an examination of drug compounding and the intricacies of the multipronged Central Hudson test.
B. The Majority Identifies the Government's Basis
The government did not argue that ads for drug compounding
concerned an unlawful activity or that they were inherently mis4
leading, which, if established, would have justified regulation.
Instead, the government sought to show that the remaining three
prongs of the Central Hudson test were met: that the restriction
served a substantial governmental interest, that it directly advanced the interest, and that it was "not more extensive than
necessary" to serve the interest. 5

ment protections to drug advertising and other commercial speech); Lars Noah & Barbara
A. Noah, Liberating Commercial Speech: ProductLabeling Controls and the FirstAmendment, 47 FLA. L. REV. 63 (1995) (finding judicial decisions made suspect requirements for
FDA prior approval of health claims); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes,and
Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 123, 155 (1996) (predicting that the case could work "a sea change" on the regulation of FDA and other agencies).
9. 447 U.S. at 566.
10. W. States, 122 S. Ct. at 1504. Neither party contended that any other test should
be applied. Id. Justice Thomas concurred in the application of the test but reiterated his
preference for a different test. Id. at 1509 (Thomas, J., concurring).
11. Id. at 1506.
12. Id. at 1510, 1515 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 1507.
14. Id. at 1504.
15. Id. at 1504-06.
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The government identified an interest in preserving the integrity of the new drug approval process, since systematic testing
protects the public from safety risks and ineffective drugs that
doctors cannot discover from observation in the practice of medicine.16 The government also identified an interest in allowing
pharmacies to compound variations of drugs when a physician
prescribes the compound for patients who have allergies, require
special dosages, or have other individualized needs.17 The FDA
recognized that requiring FDA pre-market approval of all drug
compounding would, as a practical matter, eliminate the activity
because of the costs involved in conducting drug testing and obtaining agency approval.'" The government believed there was a
separate substantial interest in balancing the availability of drug
compounding to meet individualized needs with preventing the
practice from being a guise for unregulated drug manufacturing
on a large scale.' 9 To draw this line, Congress exempted drug
compounding from new drug approval requirements, subject to
restrictions such as limits on the amount of compounding done in
advance of a physician prescription, limits on shipments out-ofstate, and most importantly, a prohibition on advertisement of
the availability of compounding for specific drugs.2 ° According to
the government, the advertising restriction directly advanced this
balancing interest because ads were neither needed nor useful for
services to meet customized individual needs, but were associated
with the production of drugs for a large market.2 Thus, the government contended that advertising is "a fair proxy for actual or
intended large-scale manufacturing," for which drug approval is
required.2 2

16. Id. at 1504.
17. Id. at 1504-05.
18. Id. at 1505. "Pharmacists do not make enough money from small-scale compounding to make safety and efficacy testing of their compounded drugs economically feasible."

Id.
19. Id. at 1505. The FDA did not allow compounding that was, for example, the
equivalent of making generic drugs without agency approval. Id. at 1502.
20. Id. However, advertising to consumers and doctors about the general availability
of compounding services was allowed. Id.
21. Id. at 1505.
22. Id.
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C. Majority'sAnalysis of Ads as Limiting the Scale of
Compounding
The majority found that the government had an important interest in preserving the integrity of the new drug approval process and in making as many drugs as possible subject to the process. 23 The Court was also willing to assume that the ad
restrictions on compounding might directly advance that interest
by precluding the marketing of compounded drugs on the large
scale that makes testing affordable.2 4 The fatal inadequacy in the
government's argument, as often occurs in commercial speech
cases,25 was in the final prong of Central Hudson: the failure to
show that the speech restriction was "not more extensive than
necessary" in light of other possible alternatives.2 6 The Court's
discussion illustrates the burden of detailed justification needed
to meet this final hurdle.
The Court thought the government's aims in preventing largescale compounding might have been met by alternative measures,
identified in an earlier FDA guidance document as indicators of
inappropriate compounding, such as the use of commercial scale
manufacturing equipment.2 The government also might have relied solely on the other restrictions in the statute, such as the
limit on the amount made in advance of receiving a prescription.2"
The Court also added the new possibility of capping the amount
of compounding for any particular drug by volume, the number of
prescriptions, or, remarkably, even by the profit a pharmacy
makes in a period of time.29 The government had failed to discuss
why these alternatives, individually or in combination, were not
sufficient.30 There was no showing by the government in the "leg23.

Id.

24. Id. at 1505-06.
25. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (finding restrictions on the
placement of ads for tobacco on billboards within 1000 feet of schools to be more extensive
than necessary); FDA Commercial Speech Restrictions Could Hold Up in Court, Agency
Says, F-D-C REP. ("THE PINK SHEET"), Aug. 12, 2002, at 29 [hereinafter PINK SHEET] (reporting an FDA attorney statement that since 1989, the Court has required government
entities to weigh costs and benefits to justify speech restrictions, and "in at least recent
years they haven't found a case where the government has done that adequately.").
26. W. States, 122 S. Ct. at 1506.
27. Id. at 1502, 1506.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1506.
30. Id.
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islative history.., or... briefs that the ad restriction was a necessary as opposed to merely convenient means."'" This type of
justification is needed because, "[i]f the First Amendment means
anything," speech restrictions "must be a last-not first32
resort."
D. The Dissent'sIdentification of a SeparateSafety Interest in
Restricting Demand
Justice Breyer believed that the majority opinion "seriously
undervalue[d]" the importance of protecting the public's health
and safety.3 3 The dissent was not directed at showing that ad restrictions are needed to reduce large-scale compounding. Instead,
Justice Breyer found that the ad restrictions promote patient
safety for all compounded drugs, regardless of size.3 4 The ad restrictions make it more likely that an individualized medical need
exists, which justifies the added risks from using an untested
compound.3 5 Without consumer ads, the doctor determines the patient's individual medical need, and does not act in response to
pressure from consumers who have seen ads about compounds.3 6
Thus, the ad restriction better ensures that the need for potentially risky unapproved products has been identified on a medical
basis by the physician and is not a mere response to an advertised convenience.3 7
Justice Breyer believed this safety objective was "presumably"
why Congress did not simply restrict volume but also restricted
ads.3 ' The dissent cited legislative history to show that Congress
was concerned not only with the volume of compounding but also
with other appropriate safety assurances.39 To show that ads can

31. Id. at 1507. While the Court called for an express showing, there also is some
plausibility that ad restrictions are more readily enforced than limits on the type of
equipment, the amount of production, or the amount of profits, information particularly in
the knowledge of the producer.
32. Id. at 1507.
33. Id. at 1510 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
34. See id. at 1509-15 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 1510 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 1510-11 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
37. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 1510 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
39. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
"[S]ome of the conditions are intended to ensure that the volume of com-
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pressure physicians to prescribe drugs that are mere conveniences, the dissent cited studies in medical journals demonstrating that doctors are pressured by direct-to-consumer ("DTC") ads
about approved prescription drugs that appear in magazines and
on television."
Justice Breyer's identification of this separate safety aim of the
ad restriction made the alternatives identified by the majority as
adequate to restrict large-scale compounding insufficient to address the risks from small-scale compounding. Thus, limits on
commercial equipment which the majority believed the FDA had
to consider as a way to limit the amount of compounding do not
serve to protect consumers of compounded drugs made on a small
scale from the added safety risks of ads merely portraying the
drugs as convenient alternatives.4 '
E. The Majority'sResponse
1. Hypothesized Rationale and the Basis for Identification of the
Government's Interest
Justice O'Connor criticized the dissenting opinion for using
"hypothesized justifications" to argue that the safety risks from
physician-pressuring support the legislation. 42 Such hypothesizing can only be used under the rational basis test used for challenges based on substantive due process to Congress's authority
to regulate products, but not for First Amendment challenges to
restrictions on commercial speech.4 1 Justice Breyer viewed his ar-

pounding does not approach that ordinarily associated with drug manufacturing" while others are "intended to ensure that the compounded drugs that
qualify for the exemption have appropriate assurances of quality and safety
since [they] would not be subject to the more comprehensive regulatory requirements that apply to commercial products."
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting 143 CONG. REC. S9840 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1997)
(statements of Senator Kennedy)). The history does not, however, refer to the ad restriction or other means as a way of providing this added safety assurance.
40. Id. at 1512-13 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The studies cited by Breyer relate to ads
about approved drugs. See infra Part III.B.
41. W. States, 122 S. Ct. at 1513. Breyer also points out that the limit on use of commercial equipment only restricts compounding to production in small batches but does not
restrict the total amount produced. Id.
42. Id. at 1507.
43. Id.
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gument as "logically related" to Congress's primary aim of "minimizing safety risks," and the general safety concern identified in
the legislative history he cited.44 With reflection, these sources
provide support, even if the steps are not spelled out. The overall
sense is that the dissent is willing to buttress the support for legislation by elaborating on the safety rationale that underlies the
general aim of the law. Moreover, if that rationale is fairly implied in the statute and its legislative history, judges should be
able to rely on it, even if it has not been explicitly raised by the
FDA.
While Justice O'Connor criticized hypothesized justifications,
she also pointed out that "[n]owhere in its briefs ... [did] the government argue" that Congress was motivated by the interest
identified by Justice Breyer.4 5 It is interesting that the Court
seemed to recognize the propriety of relying on the agency to articulate an explanation for a speech restriction not explicit in the
legislation. As a result, the agency is not constrained, as may
have been thought, to base its position solely on the grounds for
the restrictions explicitly identified by Congress.46 Consequently,
even if Justice Breyer's position was not sufficiently based in the
legislative history, the FDA could use it to support the scheme,
presumably either because Congress relies on agency judgment
and discretion in implementation of the statute,4 7 or because of
the agency's familiarity with the Congress's reasons for adopting
the statute.
The majority also noted that the Central Hudson test is "significantly stricter" than the rational basis test in another respect
since it requires "the government" to prove that the regulation directly advances the identified interest, and is not more extensive
than necessary.48 Again, the majority criticized Justice Breyer's

44. Id. at 1510 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 1507.
46. See PINK SHEET, supra note 25 (quoting an FDA attorney's statement that "in defending the compounding statute, we were not able to locate any statements or other information in the legislative record that Congress had considered alternative speech restrictions or that Congress had weighed the benefit of speech restrictions against their
cost").

47. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (recognizing that courts interpret statutory intent independently when clear from the relevant
sources, but that courts accept reasonable agency interpretations when the statute is silent and Congress has left the matter to the agency).
48. W. States, 122 S. Ct. at 1507; Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (according
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reliance on the medical journal articles about the impact of consumer ads for drugs because the studies were not relied on by the
government.4 9 If the agency simply needed to address whether the
studies indicated that ads for unapproved compounded drugs
would unduly pressure doctors, the opinion could have been expected to recognize that the ad restriction might be justified if the
government gave further attention to the relevant studies. Justice O'Connor, however, identified other difficulties in relying on
speech restrictions in this context that strongly state the commercial speech protections.
2. Ad Restrictions and Consumer Choice
The majority found that ad restrictions would not be justified
even if adopted to prevent pressure on doctors by consumers to
prescribe unapproved compounds that are not needed.5 ° The majority noted that nothing showed that physicians could not be relied upon to avoid prescribing drugs needlessly.5 ' Moreover, this
concern with unnecessary prescribing "amounts to a fear that
people would make bad decisions if given truthful information
about compounded drugs."5 2 Restricting speech to prevent such a
response is mere paternalism.5 3 The possibility that the ads might
confuse consumers about the risks of compounded drugs, as the
dissent suggested, did not warrant a preclusion of ads, since the
government did not make that argument.5 4 Significantly, the majority also found that even if the government had taken that position, the risk of confusion can be dealt with by a "warning" on the
label that the compound "had not undergone FDA testing and
that its risks were unknown."5 5
Justice O'Connor thus viewed the information provided to consumers, combined with the need for a prescription, as permitting
an adequate decision about whether to undertake unknown risks

respect to agency interpretations not made in the exercise of a delegated authority).
49. See W. States, 122 S. Ct. at 1507.

50. Id.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1507-08.
at 1507.
at 1508.
at 1508. Justice O'Connor's warning was unusually frank for a disclaimer.
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from unapproved variations of compounded drugs.56 The outcome
in the case might be explained as reflecting the special circumstance that compounded drugs are intended to respond to individual circumstances. The numerous difficulties Justice O'Connor
found with the government's position, and with Justice Breyer's
dissent, also complicate an assessment of how important each one
is individually. Still, she stated her positions about the protections accorded to commercial speech as broad principles, and if
they are to be applied on that basis, as discussed below, they may
have a significant impact on food and drug regulation.
Justice O'Connor also objected to the broad scope of the advertising restriction for compounded drugs since the restriction applied to ads directed toward doctors as well as to consumers.57
Ads to doctors about compounding specialized drugs used on a
small scale would be banned even though they may, for example,
contain information about more convenient ways of administering
dosages to children with special medical needs.5" Justice Breyer
seemed uncertain about restrictions on ads to doctors, and he did
not resolve its propriety. Since physicians get information from
various sources and the restrictions were not sufficiently dealt
with below, he left that question "in abeyance."59 This disposition
seems appropriate given the interest in avoiding the needless and
premature resolution of constitutional issues.6 °
F. Congress'sRole in Regulating CommercialSpeech
The differences among the Justices reflect their assessment
about the importance of protecting commercial speech from the
legislative process. Justice O'Connor viewed protections for commercial speech as "'indispensable' since "'[i]t is a matter of public

56. Id. at 1508-09.
57. Id. at 1509.
58. Id. Justice O'Connor also gave another example of the impropriety of the scope of
the ad restrictions: It would preclude a pharmacy from posting a notice to let parents
know about the availability of better tasting formulations of unpleasant medications that
children refuse to take. Id. The government's policy allowed pharmacies to advertise compounding service in general without reference to specific products. The general notice
might have been viewed as a reasonable means to alert parents to consult with their physicians about alternative compounds when general problems identified in the notice, such
as palatability, presented special difficulties. Id.
59. See id. at 1515 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
60. See Gilhooley, supra note 3, at 1383.
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interest that [economic] decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent
and well-informed."'' For Justice Breyer, commercial speech restrictions do not warrant the strictest speech protections because
they "do not often repress individual self-expression; they rarely
interfere with the functioning of the democratic political processes" and often relate to consumer, environmental, and health
and safety protections from commercial ventures.6 2 Justice Breyer
saw the Central Hudson test as "flexible," and as one that examines the "the restriction's proportionality,... the fit between ends
and means. 63 Justice Breyer also warned that
an overly rigid "commercial speech" doctrine will transform what
ought to be a legislative or regulatory decision about the best way to
protect the health and safety of the American public into a constitutional decision prohibiting the legislature from enacting necessary
protections. As history in respect to the Due Process Clause shows,
any such transformation
would involve a tragic constitutional mis64
understanding.

Also notable is that Chief Justice Rehnquist was one of the four
dissenters.65 The then former Justice Rehnquist also disagreed
with the majority in the first modern commercial speech case,
where he urged that the First Amendment should be interpreted
as protecting political speech and discussion of public issues, but
not purchasing decisions which lack ideological content.6 6 The dissenters here, Chief Justice Rehnquist included, did not reject
CentralHudson as the governing test, but were more willing to be
generous to the statutory purpose in its application.6 7 Yet they

61. W. States, 122 S. Ct. at 1503 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976)).
62. Id. at 1514 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
63. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1515 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Margaret Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Food and Drug Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 815, 869-77 (2000) (expressing concern about the
rigor of the commercial speech test in limiting Congress from requiring agency approval,
and questioning the differences from the rational basis test).
A dramatic example of the difference between the constitutional standards is that while
the Court struck the advertising restrictions, compounding may be impermissible under
the general provisions of the law when it is equivalent to manufacturing a new drug. See
W. States, 122 S. Ct. at 1504-06. Product prohibitions also restrict the user's freedom, but
speech restrictions get greater protection. See Gilhooley, supra, at 875-76.
65. See W. States, 122 S. Ct. at 1509 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
66. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 787 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In a
switch from the line-up in recent 5-4 decisions, Justice Souter joined the majority in Western States. 122 S. Ct. at 1499.
67. See W. States, 122 S. Ct. at 1515 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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are the dissenters. Thus, the validity of other types of commercial
speech restrictions are open to question under the Court's more
rigorous test for commercial speech restrictions.
III. IMPACT ON REGULATION OF DRUG AND HEALTH CLAIMS
The most immediate question about Western States is the impact it will have on other aspects of food and drug regulation.
These issues are highlighted by the FDA's recent request for
comments on the impact of the First Amendment on the FDA's
regulation of claims,6" a request that has itself been criticized for
its breadth.69 This article examines the relevance of the judicial
decision to a contentious and important issue: whether drug
manufacturers can distribute medical articles about new off-label
uses of drugs to doctors, without FDA approval, but with a disclaimer. The discussion will also deal with other important issues
raised in the notice, such as the impact of the First Amendment
on direct-to-consumer advertising of approved drugs.
The potential impact of the protections for commercial speech
in Western States, if broadly read, cuts deeper into the regulatory
scheme. As the FDA stated, "much of the operation" of the law
"depends on the use of words."7 ° Moreover, the Court objected to
the paternalism of restricting truthful commercial speech out of a
fear that people will make "bad decisions" with respect to unnecessary drug compounds when they bear a disclaimer that the
risks are unknown.71 The law, however, prohibits the sale of unapproved drugs that have not been proven safe and effective.72
Consumers and physicians cannot get access to drugs that are
untested simply based on a disclaimer about the lack of testing

68. Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,942, 34,942
(May 16, 2002).
69. See William B. Schultz & Michael R. Taylor, Hazardous Hucksters, WASH. POST,
May 28, 2002, at A17. The FDA placed public health protections "in jeopardy" when it
urged the public and industries "to supply it with arguments" about whether commercial
speech limits its power over advertising, an outgrowth of "a movement led by conservative
judges, academics and advocacy groups who argue that the First Amendment limits the
government's power to limit advertising even when important public health interests are
at stake." Id.
70. 67 Fed. Reg. at 34,943.
71. W. States, 122 S. Ct. at 1507.
72. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000).
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and lack of FDA approval.7 3 Indeed, the prescription drug provisions can also be called paternalistic since consumers cannot buy
the drugs without a prescription merely based on a disclaimer
that the user should consult a physician.74
The breadth of the agency's request for comments and the
breadth of the reasoning in the Court's decision makes it important to examine the reasons for the regulatory scheme, in addition to considering the specific issues. Moreover, an evaluation is
needed of what disclosures are necessary to keep consumers and
physicians from being misled, assuming that a complete restriction of the speech is not permissible in some cases. My analysis of
the impact of commercial speech developments on FDA regulation
is given below and is an expansion of my comments to the agency.
The agency also raises the issues as constitutional questions,
thus side-stepping the need to consider any statutory questions or
administrative law issues that may exist. Avoiding deciding constitutional issues unnecessarily is highly important, and ordinarily these alternative grounds should be the first step in the analysis.75 However, the issues have been framed by the agency's
request as constitutional ones, and therefore some response on
that basis must be made.
A. Justificationfor Pre-MarketApproval of Drug Claims
1. Scope of Agency's Request
The FDA's notice asks some very general questions about the
basis for drug regulation, in a manner that suggests a wide scope
for the agency's inquiry.76 The first question is whether there are
arguments for regulating speech about drugs more comprehensively than dietary supplements-which have been deregulated-

73. Id.
74. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(B) (2000); see also United States v. E1-O-Pathic Pharmacy,
192 F.2d 62, 75 (9th Cir. 1951) (finding a drug needing professional supervision could not
be sold directly to consumers based on a statement to consult a physician, relying on 21
U.S.C. § 352(f)(1) (1946)). For a critique of the prescription drug requirements, see Peter
Temin, The Origins of Compulsory DrugPrescriptions,22 J.L. & ECON. 91 (1979).
75. See Gilhooley, supra note 3, at 1383; Gilhooley, supra note 64, at 815.
76. See Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,942 (May
16, 2002).

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:901

and what "an administrative record" must contain "to sustain
such a position. 7 7 The agency later asks with respect to products
in general whether the First Amendment or social science evidence supports giving the government greater latitude to regulate
labels as compared with advertising.78 These questions could relate to eliciting support for the need for the existing regulation of
drug claims. On the other hand, the questions could be read as
indirectly putting into question the constitutional validity of the
requirement for pre-market approval of drugs, because of the implication of the need for more evidence to regulate claims on labels, as well as in advertisements, that relate to unapproved uses
of drugs. These questions, if meant to be read so broadly, are so
fundamental that some general comments are needed on the importance of Congress's determinations about the need for drug
regulation.
While it is appropriate to consider the implications of the Western States decision and other lower court decisions dealing with
commercial speech, I do not believe they should be read as intended to undercut the constitutional validity of the pre-market
approval requirements for drugs. Indeed, the majority in Western
States found that the new drug approval process is "clearly an
important governmental interest, and the government has every
reason to want as many drugs as possible to be subject to that
approval process.

'79

The case can also be seen as dealing with a

special situation: when the ordinary drug testing requirements
economically cannot be met but there is still a recognized interest
in making the compounded drugs available to handle individual
circumstances.
2. Differences in Dietary Supplement Statutory Scheme
Dietary supplements are not ordinarily subject to prior safety
review, nor is there pre-market approval for their "structure or
function" claims when the claim is accompanied by a disclaimer
about the lack of FDA approval.80 Congress established a less rig-

77.
78.
79.
80.
harm);

Id. at 34,943.
Id. at 34,944.
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 122 S. Ct. 1497, 1505 (2002).
21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(2)(F) (2000) (need for FDA showing of a significant risk of
id. § 350(b) (2000) (substantiation required only for new dietary ingredients).
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orous system for these products because of a congressional assessment that the supplements are "safe within a broad range of
intake, and safety problems with the supplements are relatively
rare."8 Moreover, the claims can relate only to the "structure or2
function" of the body and not disease prevention and treatment.1
The line between disease and structure or function claims is debatable, and agency action or legislative change is needed to provide better disclosures and support for the claims, and to assure
better substantiation for the safety of the supplements.8 3
Whatever the case is for supplements, the need for strong drug
regulation is more imperative. Drugs often use potent chemicals
that can cause harm, and they cannot be considered safe unless
their effectiveness in treating or preventing disease outweighs
these harmful effects. Furthermore, if drugs are ineffective, the
delay in getting better treatment can also cause harm. These factors clearly justify Congress's determination that pre-market approval is needed to ensure the safety and efficacy of drugs, notwithstanding its willingness to adopt a less rigorous scheme, with
disclaimers, for supplement claims.
3. Support Needed for Speech Restrictions
As noted above, the FDA notice asks if there is social science
evidence or an administrative record to support FDA regulation
of speech about drugs. 4 FDA drug regulation is not simply an
administrative decision; instead, it is based on statutory requirements. Congress's reasons for enacting the requirements, in light
of the experience of harm from drugs, provides all the support
needed for the scheme. In 1937, a manufacturer changed the drug
sulfanilamide to a liquid form by using an ingredient found in antifreeze without testing the safety of the new formulation, a

81. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. Law 103-417, §
2(14), 108 Stat. 4325, 4326 (2000).
82. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6) (2000).
83.

REPORT OF COMMISSION ON DIETARY SUPPLEMENT LABELS, at x,

25 (1997)

(discussing access to files and warnings on lack of safety substantiation); Margaret
Gilhooley, Deregulation and the Administrative Role, 62 MONT. L. REV. 85, 110-13, 11819 (2001); see discussion infra Part III.C.5 (discussing significant scientific agreement for
substantiation).
84. Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,942, 34,944
(May 16, 2002).
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change that led to over seventy-three deaths.85 Congress responded by requiring prior review of the safety of new drugs. 6
The birth defects caused overseas by thalidomide led to the
strengthening of the drug laws and a requirement for pre-market
approval of the effectiveness, as well as the safety, of drugs.8
This historical experience with the harm that can occur with insufficient review convinced Congress of the importance of having
strong safeguards to protect the public. That determination and
value judgment provides sufficient support for the statutory requirements that restrict promotion of drugs for unapproved uses
by manufacturers on the labels or in advertising, without the
need for additional social science research. Moreover, the Supreme Court found that the statutory requirements for adequate
and well-controlled studies as the basis for approving drugs reflected "the conclusion of Congress, based upon hearings, that
clinical impressions of practicing physicians and poorly controlled
experiments" were not adequate evidence of efficacy. 8 While the
constitutional protections for commercial speech were not at issue, it would be anomalous if the Court were now to find Congress's reasons for requiring scientific testing to be of only marginal significance. 9
4. Statutory Tests as Benchmarks for Disclaimers
Some may maintain that providing disclaimers about the lack
of studies is an alternative to conducting drug testing. Whether
disclaimers ought to be used should be a congressional decision.
While disclaimers are not an adequate substitute for testing, if
they are ever to be used for drugs, the burden should be on the
companies who seek to use them to show that consumers-and

85. David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History
and Its Substantive Provisions, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2, 20 (1939).
86. Id.
87. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000) (requiring approval of the effectiveness of drugs).
88. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 630 (1973).
89. The FDA notice asks about the administrative record needed to support its positions. 67 Fed. Reg. at 34,943. It should be borne in mind that the administrative record for
agency regulations need not always be based on empirical evidence. As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated, a "regulation that is self-evidently rational is not
less legitimate than a regulation whose rationality must depend on elaborate statistical,
expert, or other evidence." Nat'l Confectioners Ass'n v. Califano, 569 F.2d 690, 695 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
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busy practicing physicians-can clearly understand the disclaimers, and are not misled. Common experience indicates that users
find it difficult to assess small-print complicated qualifications of
a claim. When the unapproved claim is in headlines, the disclaimer qualifying it also needs to be simple and comparable to a
headline in clarity. The statutory standard for approval should
also provide the benchmark for judging the type of disclaimers
that are needed. Thus, any disclaimers relating to drugs should
indicate the specific ways in which the product lacks the adequate
and well-controlled studies needed for approval. In the case of
disease claims, we are dealing not merely with economic harm.
The need to protect the public from the safety risks and potential
ineffectiveness of powerful drugs provides the rational support for
the pre-market approval requirement. If, nonetheless, Congress is
found to be without the power to provide that safeguard to the
American public, the promoter of the unapproved claim should
have the burden to show that disclaimers are adequate to alert
the user to the specific support that is lacking.
B. Direct-to-ConsumerAdvertisements
1. Present Policy as Meeting the Constitutional Tests
The FDA asks if its approach to direct-to-consumer ("DTC") advertising is "consistent with empirical research" and with "relevant legal authority."9" Unlike the FDA policy at issue in Western
States, the FDA does not preclude all DTC ads for approved
drugs. Instead, its approach is geared toward preventing consumers from being misled about the approved use and the important
side-effects. Thus, the focus for any re-examination should not be
on the constitutional validity of the FDA's present program, but
on whether changes are needed for policy or statutory reasons.
Some changes may be appropriate, for example, in the manner of
providing information to consumers. The inclusion in consumer
magazines of the small print professional labeling for drugs has
little value, and more attention to an adequate disclosure in consumer-friendly language of the significant risks would be better.
Furthermore, the FDA guidance for the ads does not call for prior

90.

67 Fed. Reg. at 34,943.
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review of DTC ads, although it encourages consultation.9 1 Since
the statute provides standards for prior review of drug advertisements,9 2 whether such a requirement is appropriate or needed
becomes-in the first instance-a statutory question and not a
constitutional one.
2. Changes to Limit Over-Prescription
The FDA's notice also asks if the DTC ads lead to overprescription and if they encourage treatment for under-diagnosed
diseases." The FDA questions are phrased generally and are
broad enough to encompass restricting advertisements for drugs
that are over-prescribed.9 4 Any effort to restrict drug advertisements to prevent over-prescription would have to meet the commercial speech tests identified in Western States.9 5 Whether an
agency initiative could do so would depend on an assessment of
the particular proposal and its justification.9 6 Showing that drugs
are over-prescribed will be a critical step. Moreover, any regulatory proposal will have to take account of the majority's position
in Western States that the government cannot impose speech restrictions to preclude people from making "bad decisions" about
drugs that are not needed when the speech is truthful and the
risk of deception can be met by a warning about unknown risks.97
Still, the FDA has identified an important policy issue with respect to the over-prescription of drugs, and the agency should
pursue investigating ways to achieve this aim in ways that meet
the Court's standards.
There has also been an interest in legislation that would restrict or discourage DTC ads because the ads are seen as increasing the costs of drugs, making it more difficult for consumers, in-

91. FDA Guidance for Industry Consumer-Direct Broadcast Advertisements (Aug.
1999), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/1804fnl.pdf (last visited Jan. 24,
2003).
92. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2000) (providing FDA authority over-prescription drug advertising and specifying that prior review can be required only if there are "extraordinary circumstances").
93. 67 Fed. Reg. at 34,943.
94. Id.
95. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 122 S. Ct. 1497, 1504 (2002).
96. See id.
97. See id. at 1507.
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surers, employee benefit plans, and the government to cover the
costs for prescription drugs.9" While the legislative developments
are beyond the scope of this article, any proposals will also have
to consider Western States's reasoning that it would be unconstitutional paternalism for the government to bar truthful ads about
unapproved drug compounds that have warnings to prevent confusion about unknown risks.99 Whether promoting the affordability of drugs counts as a substantial governmental interest presents a new factor that needs to be evaluated in sorting out the
Central Hudson prongs in this setting. The government would
also need to provide an assessment of why other alternatives are
insufficient to address the cost concern. As a consequence, legislative proposals in this area may focus, in the first instance, not
simply on the merits of the legislation or its political viability, but
on what the Court will allow.
3. Better Disclosures About Physician's Role
Another approach for the FDA to consider in reassessing DTC
ads is the need to provide better disclosures in the ads about the
basis for the physician's decision.100 The agency asked if the current approach to DTC advertising creates any impediments to the
ability of doctors to give optimal medical advice. The single-drug
focus of the DTC ads can lead to special pressures on doctors to
prescribe a particular drug. I recommend that the DTC ads state
prominently that consumers need to "Consult your doctor about
the range of treatment choices that may be available, and their
risks, benefits and costs." Disclosure to prevent consumer deception is permissible under the standards governing commercial
speech, and this disclosure prevents consumers from being misled
when the ad fails to indicate the range of factors that need to be

98. PINK SHEET, supra note 25, at 29; see S. 2486, 107th Cong. (2002) (noting that a
legislative proposal to limit companies' tax deduction for marketing to no more than its
research expenses has been criticized as unconstitutional because it is aimed at preventing truthful ads about drugs); see also NAT'L INST. FOR HEALTHCARE MNGT. RESEARCH &
EDUC. FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND MASS MEDIA ADVERTISING, 2000 (2001), available at http://www.nihcm.org/DTCbrief 2001.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2003) (maintaining
that a relatively small number of prescription drugs that were advertised contributed significantly to the increase in pharmaceutical spending from 1999 to 2000).
99. See W. States, 122 S. Ct. at 1507.
100. Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,942, 34,943
(May 16, 2002).
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considered by the consumer and the doctor in making the drug
choice.
The role of the physician is to advise patients about the choice
of therapies in light of available drug and non-drug treatments,
the potential side-effects from these treatments, the patient's particular situation, the relative efficacy of the treatments, and cost
factors-including the availability of generic drugs. The survey
cited by the dissenting judges in Western States indicated that
family physicians reported DTC advertisements pressure physicians to prescribe drugs they would not ordinarily prescribe.''
The majority in Western States found this single survey insufficient to support an advertising ban.0 2 The FDA should consider
whether existing and future surveys provide support for reducing
unwarranted pressure on the physician by providing disclosures
about the range of advice the patient needs from the doctor.
The typical statement in DTC ads advises the consumer to consult their physician about the drug, and to see if the advertised
drug is "right for you," suggests that the decision is drug-specific,
dependent on the side effects for the particular drug. If the ads
made clearer the fact that drug choices are relative, they would
accord greater respect to the physician's role. Additionally, this
would help alleviate the pressure doctors feel from consumer advertisements aimed at a single drug. Moreover, there is a need to
make consumers aware of the need for advice from their physician on the relative benefits and costs of generic drugs and other
treatments.
4. Better Data and Delay in Ads for New Products
Further attention may be needed to discover ways to ensure
that physicians have sufficient information to advise consumers
about the relative choice between drugs. The FDA does not now
base the approval of drugs on their relative efficacy, although it
considers relative safety.0 3 Under a system used by the FDA to
determine priorities for drug reviews, two-thirds of drugs ap-

101. W. States, 122 S. Ct. at 1512 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 1507.
103. PETER BANTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW 527-28 (2d.
ed. 1991).
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proved in the 1990s were simply modified versions of existing
drugs and not significant advances in drug therapy." 4 The development of better data on the relative efficacy of drugs has been
identified as important to guide health insurers, doctors, and pabeen made for creating a research institients.'0 5 A proposal has
10 6
so.
do
to
way
a
tute as
A delay in the use of the ads in the mass media might also be
appropriate if the FDA could show that a phase-in of the wide
sale of newly approved drugs is needed for safety reasons to permit physicians and the agency to assess whether the newly-sold
drugs pose risks not detectable in the limited size of the clinical
studies.' 7 The FDA should take account of the need for better information and disclosures to prevent deception as part of its reassessment of its policy towards DTC ads.
C. Off-Label Uses of PrescriptionDrugs
1. Relevance of Western States
The FDA asks about the extent of its ability to regulate speech
about off-label uses and whether permitting speech by manufacturers about off-label uses would undermine the new drug approval process."' Read broadly, Western States can be seen as
raising the issue of whether disclaimers can provide a reasonable
alternative to restrictions on speech by the manufacturer about

104. Melody Peterson, New Medicines Seldom Contain Anything New, Study Finds,
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2002, at C1. The article describes a study by an institute, which receives funding from health insurers, finding that two-thirds of the drugs approved between 1989 and 2000 were modified versions of existing drugs and were the most heavily
advertised to consumers. Id. The article also reported that a representative of drug manufacturers said that drugs that copy those already on the market could still offer benefits to
patients since patients may respond to one medication but not another. Id.
105. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Perspectives on the Pharmaceutical Industry, 20 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 136, 147 (2001).
106. Id. at 146-47.
107. TASK FORCE ON RISK MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MANAGING
THE RISK FROM MEDICAL PRODUCT USE 46 (1999) [hereinafter TASK FORCE ON RISK
MGMT.] (reporting that new products reach consumers so quickly that "often dozens to
hundreds of adverse reactions can occur before they are recognized and action is taken to
reduce their effects"). Western States, however, might be read to permit the distribution of
the advertisements so long as they include a warning that the risks are unknown.
108. Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,942, 34,944
(May 16, 2002).
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off-label uses of drugs. This issue is most relevant with respect to
the distribution by pharmaceutical companies to doctors of medical articles about off-label uses of approved drugs. °9
In the case of medical journal articles, the FDA recognizes that
doctors, as part of the practice of medicine, will discover off-label
uses for approved drugs, and that medical researchers investigate
these uses and communicate their conclusions to practitioners in
accordance with the standards of the profession. 110 The FDA's position on the extent to which manufacturers can initiate distribution of medical articles has already been the subject of litigation."' This litigation ended on appeal without reaching the
constitutional merits. The FDA withdrew its prior guidance, leaving the FDA policy as reflecting simply its traditional objection to
a manufacturer's distribution of materials intended to promote
unapproved uses of drugs. 12
In Western States, the Court assumed that a statutory preclusion of advertising to physicians and consumers of the willingness
of a pharmacy to "compound" specific drugs, without FDA approval of the variation, would promote the valid governmental interest in the integrity of the new drug approval process." 3 Nonetheless, the Court found that before suppressing speech, the
government had to consider other alternatives, and that the potential for misleading advertising about drug risks could be dealt
with by a "warning that the drug had not undergone FDA testing
and that its risks were unknown."' The Court, in pointed langnage, found that "if the First Amendment means anything, it

109. Promotion of off-label uses by manufacturers that is not based on peer-reviewed
medical articles should clearly be considered impermissible-no matter what disclaimers
are used-since allowing that promotion would undercut the drug approval process.
110. This reporting of scientific information is clearly protected by the First Amendment. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV.
245, 256-57 (1961).
111. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
112. Id. at 332; see also Gilhooley, supra note 3. See Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S.
345 (1948) (finding that statutory prohibitions applied to labeling and advertising that explained the uses of a drug).
113. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr, 122 S. Ct. 1497, 1505 (2002). The law allowed
advertisements to consumers and doctors of the general availability of compounding services, but only if no specific drugs were identified. 21 U.S.C. § 353a(c) (2000).
114. W. States, 122 S. Ct. at 1508. Other alternatives included banning commercial
scale manufacturing equipment for compounding. Id. at 1506.
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means that regulating
resort."1 15

speech must be a last-not first-

The FDA's position about medical articles describing off-label
uses may be affected by the Court's treatment of pharmacy compounding if the decision is read broadly. If the First Amendment
protects ads for unapproved compounds made to consumers and
doctors when the ad has a disclaimer that the risks are unknown,
the Constitution could logically also protect the distribution by
drug companies of medical articles to doctors about unapproved
off-label uses when the distribution is accompanied by a disclosure about the lack of FDA approval. The FDA, though, has not
been willing to accept the adequacy of a disclaimer as sufficient to
allow the manufacturer to distribute reprints when the distribution would show an intent to make an unapproved drug claim.' 16
While there are some similarities, there also are important differences between drug compounding and the promotion of off-label
uses." 7 Moreover, there are substantial difficulties in providing
adequate disclaimers about the off-label uses."'
2. Differences in Need for Review of New Off-Label Uses
Western States dealt with "pharmacy compounding," which
primarily relates to making changes in the formulation of an approved drug by using approved ingredients to deal with individual patient needs in light of individual variability."1 9 Compound-

115. Id. at 1507.
116. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D.D.C. 1998) (enjoining enforcement of a legislative enactment and agency guidance documents that precluded
manufacturers from distributing reprints that had a disclosure about the lack of FDA approval). The FDA appealed and the Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's injunction on the grounds that there was no facial restriction of speech, since the agency had
withdrawn its earlier guidance document, and the agency had interpreted the legislation
as a "safe harbor." See Wash. Legal Found., 202 F.3d at 332. The legislative provision at
issue was enacted in 1997 in the Food and Drug Modernization Act ("FDAMA") and provided a modified review system that can be used by manufacturers who distribute reprints. 21 U.S.C.§ 360aaa (2000). Under the FDAMA option, the manufacturer gives advance notification to the FDA of the journal distribution, receives FDA comments on the
disclosures needed, files a supplemental new drug application with the agency and does
additional testing after distribution of the journal article if the FDA found additional tests
needed.Id.
117. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
118. See discussion infra Part III.C.3; see also Gilhooley, supra note 64, at 820-22.
119. See W. States, 122 S. Ct. at 1500-02 (describing compounding and the statutory
requirements governing compounding that includes the use of approved ingredients).
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ing responds to individualized needs and this focus should help
limit the extent to which compounding occurs and the potential
for widespread harm to the public.12° With off-label uses, promoted by major pharmaceutical companies, wider use can occur
on a national basis, with a greater risk that the drugs can pose
safety risks and delay effective treatment for wide numbers of
people. Moreover, the large market for off-label uses and the involvement of the pharmaceutical company make possible the type
of costly testing needed for drug approval, which is not economically viable for the small-scale efforts involved in pharmacy compounding done to meet individual needs.12'
The promotion of off-label uses also threatens the integrity of
the new drug approval process in a basic way.'22 If that promotion
is permitted, drug manufacturers may obtain agency approval for
the least risky use of the drug, and the use with efficacy that is
the easiest to establish. 2 ' The riskier uses with borderline efficacy and narrow and possibly inappropriate risk/benefit ratios
can become widespread based on a journal article with disclaimers. "24
' The government will lose the ability to determine that the
public needs to be protected by an independent agency review of
the added risks, due to an off-label use promoted by the manufacturer in distributed reprints. 25 Not only is agency review independent, the FDA also has access to all of the underlying data to
support claims, even those that are trade secrets. However, the
access of medical journals to information about protocols and data
analysis is affected by the manufacturer's interest in the proprietary nature of the database.'26

120. Id. at 1500.
121. See id. at 1505.
122. Id.
123. See Gilhooley, supra note 64, at 828-29, 835-36 (discussing how FDA approved
individual drugs for short-term use, but safety complications arose when the unapproved
combination of the drugs, referred to as "fen-phen," came to be used extensively on a longterm basis as a diet aid based on a medical article).
124. See id.
125. See id. at 829-31.
126. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., PHRMA PRINCIPLES ON CONDUCT OF CLINICAL

TRIALS

AND

COMMUNICATION

OF

CLINICAL

TRIAL RESULTS

24,

available at

http://www.PhRMA.org/publications/policy/2002-06-24.430.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2003)
(stating that "if requested by a medical journal when reviewing a submitted manuscript
for publication, the clinical trial sponsor will provide a synopsis of the clinical trial protocol and/or pre-specified plan for data analysis with the understanding that such documents are confidential and shall be returned to the sponsor"). See id. at 22 for a provision
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3. Obstacles to Making Disclaimers Adequate
A separate difficulty is that providing adequate disclosures
about off-label uses presents seemingly insurmountable obstacles.
These obstacles become clearer if one tries to envision what would
make disclaimers adequate, taking into account the significance
that the manufacturer's distribution of the article will have for
physicians.127
a. Warning Caption
Disclaimers, if they could be made adequate, would require a
bluntness that those seeking them may characterize as unnecessary. This issue can be seen by examining the disclaimer identified by the Supreme Court of the United States as suitable in
Western States. The Court found that claims not approved by the
FDA should be identified by a "warning" to the consumer.12 Use
of a "warning" as the introductory signal is also appropriate with
respect to off-label uses, given the importance of alerting the physician to the significant responsibility that he or she is undertak129
ing in evaluating off-label uses promoted by the manufacturer.
However, there is likely to be resistance to such a clear signal.
Nonetheless, it should be required, and if it is not, the manufacturer should have to provide the evidence that other captions are
fully adequate to alert physicians. 3 '
b. Distribution as Endorsement
When a pharmaceutical company distributes a medical article
reporting off-label uses, physicians may see the distribution as an
endorsement by the company of the new use as adequate to meet
the standards of the profession as well as the usual testing standards for drugs. The physician may also assume that if the new

that "as owners of the study database, sponsors have discretion to determine who will
have access to the database. Generally, study databases are only made available to regulatory authorities.... Sponsors will make a summary of the study results available to the
investigators [in multi-site clinical trials]."
127. See Gilhooley, supra note 64, at 836.
128. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr, 122 S. Ct. 1497, 1508 (2002).
129. See Gilhooley, supra note 64, at 836-37.
130. Id.
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use proves harmful, the manufacturer will be subject to product
liability for any inadequacies in the testing or warnings that the
manufacturer provides with the medical article on the off-label
use.
In the absence of a manufacturer endorsement of the off-label
use, the physician would recognize the potential for medical malpractice liability if the new use does not meet professional standards. The physician would exercise the cautions involved in being sure that the off-label use fully meets the standards of the
profession. Whether the liability of the manufacturer would replace or lessen professional liability in this setting is a difficult
question, and one that the FDA is not in a position to resolve. The
relevant point is that the physician's perception of the manufacturer's endorsement can lessen the extent to which the physician
will rely solely on professional assessment. Thus, a disclosure
would be needed that the manufacturer's distribution is not an
endorsement that the article shows that the off-label use meets
the professional standards (assuming this to be the manufacturer's position).
c. Specific Differences from FDA Testing Requirements
If a disclosure system were to be used, it would need to indicate
the specific ways in which the off-label use did not have the testing normally required for FDA approval.' A blanket statement
that the risks of the off-label use are unknown, suggested in
Western States, is not suitable in this context. 3 2 The testing reported in the medical journal is likely to have identified some
risks associated with the new use, and the FDA labeling for the
approved use will indicate others. Instead, the difficulty will be
whether the testing in the medical article is sufficient.
An adequate disclosure in this situation also needs to indicate
more than the lack of FDA approval. Indeed, the disclosure identified by the Supreme Court of the United States in Western
States referred to the lack of FDA testing, not to the lack of FDA

131. Whether there needs to be any separate disclosures to patients is an important
matter not explored in this article.
132. See Gilhooley, supra note 83, at 114.
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approval. 13 3 In dealing with off-label uses promoted by the manufacturer, the physician needs the benefit of knowing how the
studies in the medical journal differ from the testing the FDA requires. Individual physicians have limited time to undertake
studies about differences reported in the literature, and they are
not in a position to determine the efficacy and risks of a drug
within the limits of their practice."3 The variability in the quality
of articles in medical journals makes this type of specific disclosure critical.' 35
To adequately inform physicians, there should be a disclosure
reporting the extent to which the medical journal article, relied
on to support the off-label use, fails to meet the usual FDA standards for drug testing.'3 6 This disclosure should cover any differences with respect to the number of test subjects and the type of
testing and controls. Moreover, if this is the type of situation in
which the FDA would call for post-use "Phase IV" studies, the
warning should disclose whether any such studies are being undertaken.
d. Material Omissions
The manufacturer should ensure that there is adequate disclosure of any other material information that would affect the assessment of the journal article, such as contradictory
results from
37
an unreported study known to the manufacturer.1
e. Provision for Post-Market Surveillance
Increasingly, there has been recognition of the need for an adequate post-market surveillance system to detect adverse reactions
that are not detectable within the testing limits of reliable stud-

133. W. States, 122 S. Ct. at 1508.
134. See Gilhooley, supra note 64, at 836-37.
135. See Drummond Rennie, Fourth InternationalCongress on Peer Review in Biomedical Publication, 287 JAMA 2759, 2760 (2002) (finding that there continues to be abundant
evidence that even with peer review "there are scarcely any bars to eventual publication").
136. See Gilhooley, supra note 83, at 113-14.
137. Frank Davidoff, et al., Sponsorship,Authorship and Accountability, 345 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 825, 825 (2001) (stating that "the results of the finished trial may be buried rather
than published if they are unfavorable to the sponsor's product").
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ies. 1 ' There could be complications in knowing how to deal with
adverse reactions attributable to off-label uses in the postmarketing adverse reaction reporting. Reactions based on offlabel uses might be discounted as based on misuses of the drug
for which the manufacturer has little responsibility. However,
when the manufacturer is encouraging the off-label use by distributing medical journal articles, particular attention should be
paid, in the reporting system and the disclosure, to reactions associated with these uses.
f. Conflict of Interest and Independent Review
There should also be disclosure about any conflict of interest
between those doing the study reported in the medical article and
the pharmaceutical company distributing the reprint so that the
reader can take account of the potential for bias. 39 Moreover,
there should be a disclosure of whether there has been any independent review of the medical testing by those without any conflict of interest."4 ° A disclosure approach still suffers the key
drawback of not providing the safeguard of an independent review."' The FDA's employees and its advisory committees's members are subject to requirements that preclude a role when there
4
is a conflict of interest."
4. Notification and Prior Review of Distributions and Disclaimers
If a disclosure system were to be used, the manufacturer
should be obliged to notify the FDA of the dissemination by the
manufacturer of the reprint from the medical journal, and related
material such as cover letters, sent to physicians about off-label

138. See TASK FORCE ON RISK MGMT., supra note 107, at 43-45.
139. See Marcia Angell, Is Academic Medicine for Sale? 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1516,
1516-17 (2002).
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. The revised standards for the leading peer-reviewed journals call for authors of
review articles not merely to disclose conflicts, but to have no conflicts of interest that are
"significant." This policy, even as modified, provides an indication of the importance of independent review, and that there are times when mere disclosure is not enough. Jeffrey
M. Drazen & Gregory D. Curfman, FinancialAssociations of Authors, 346 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1901 (2002); see also Marcia Angell, supra note 139, at 1516.
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uses. These cover letters can be important in conveying the
manufacturers' endorsement of the off-label use reported in the
medical journal. Without such a notification requirement, the
FDA is in a poor position to know about the dissemination and
the disclosures, and to take enforcement action to correct misleading disclosures. The FDA has proposed to require that companies provide the agency notice of new uses of biotechnology for
foods, and has identified the legal basis for finding such a notification necessary to carry out its authority to efficiently enforce
the law.143 That rationale also seems applicable to the problems
presented by promotion of medical articles about off-label uses.
Moreover, the need for FDA prior review of disclaimers for unapproved health claims on dietary supplements has been recognized in Pearsonv. Shalala, a major commercial speech case."' If
prior review of the disclaimers for supplements is appropriate,
notification of the distributions of articles and related material
about off-label uses of drugs is clearly needed. Pearson also provides support for prior reviews of the disclaimers to be provided
with journal articles about off-label uses.' 45 If disclosures alone
were to be relied upon, the disclaimer accompanying the distribution of the medical article should indicate any FDA comments
and the status of any testing recommended by FDA.14
5. GRAS/E Status
The FDA should acknowledge the circumstances when the
warning and disclosures described above are not needed. In some
cases, it may be that off-label uses described in medical articles
may have sufficient scientific support and expert acceptance that
they could become Generally Recognized as Safe and Effective
("GRAS/E").' 47 When new drugs are initially developed, they can143. See Pre-Market Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706 (Jan.
18, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 192, 592).
144. 164 F.3d 650, 657-58 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
145. Id. at 658 n.7.
146. In FDAMA, Congress provided an alternative means for manufacturers to distribute reprints about off-label uses, and this "safe harbor" could still provide a framework for
obtaining agency comments. The FDAMA process included prior notification of the distribution, a 60-day delay for FDA comments, an undertaking to do additional testing found
necessary by FDA, and a filing of a supplemental notification. 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(b)(c)
(2000); see Gilhooley, supra note 64, at 830-31.
147. 21 U.S.C § 321(p) (2000) (defining new drugs as those that are not GRAS/E).
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not be GRAS/E because the drug will not have been used for the
material time needed for expert recognition. 148 The standards for
GRAS/E are high. As the Supreme Court of the United States has
found, experts would not generally recognize a drug as safe and
effective without the type of adequate and well-controlled studies
needed to obtain FDA approval.14 Thus, it may be rare that offlabel uses could achieve this status.
The FDA might consider whether it should establish criteria
and a process for affirming off-label uses that have attained
GRAS/E status based on the adequacy of the studies, extensive
use, and expert recognition. When that exists, the product would
not need the disclaimers described here. A benefit of establishing
this procedure would be to encourage manufacturers to sponsor
fuller studies for off-label uses that provide the level of support
and safeguards needed for GRAS/E recognition. This would be
preferable to having manufacturers distribute medical articles
that need extensive disclaimers.
D. Health Claims on Foods
The FDA asks if different standards can be used for health
claims on foods than the approach found constitutionally applicable to health claims on dietary supplements. ° There are reasons
to believe that differences exist. Dietary supplement users seek
the products out and may be willing to spend more time studying
a disclaimer. In contrast, foods are a necessity and shoppers have
limited time to review the details of disclaimers while making selections. Consumers can lose confidence in health claims generally if preliminary and weakly supported claims are frequently
put in question by new information. The valid claims that promote healthy dietary choice should not be obscured by weak
claims whose validity is continually undercut.
This need for stability and confidence in health claims led to
the statutory requirement for agency approval of claims when
they are supported by significant scientific agreement based on

148. Id.; see Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, 412 U.S. 609, 631-32 (1973).
149. Weinberger, 412 U.S. at 633-34.
150. Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,942, 34,943
(May 16, 2002); see also Gilhooley, supranote 83, at 110-11.
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the totality of the evidence, including well-designed studies." 1 If
disclaimers are to be used, the best way to provide an adequate
disclaimer would be for the unapproved claims to state that they
do not meet the key statutory requirement of "significant scientific agreement."1 5 2 However, the Pearson court found this standard vague and remanded for better identification of the standard. "' 3 The FDA should pursue articulating the criteria for
significant scientific agreement. The FDA has already recognized
that the standard does not require the wide degree of consensus
among experts needed for general recognition of drugs. Perhaps
the FDA could make clear that the standard for food health
claims is met if there is majority acceptance by the leading qualified experts, which can be shown by affirmative endorsement by
the leading organizations. Scientific support is especially needed
in this field because the ultimate validity of the claim depends
upon long-term studies and population studies that are difficult
to conduct.' 54 The support of scientific experts serves as a safeguard in the absence of full testing. Of course, further experience
and full testing could show that the views of the experts are incorrect.' 55 Still, unless that happens, the consumer should have
the benefit of knowing whether a majority of experts agree with
the claim.
The alternative form for the disclosure should build on that
used by the FDA for dietary supplements on remand from the
Pearson case. 56 Thus, it should state that the FDA does not endorse the claim, but it should also state that the FDA does not do
so based on the lack of long-term studies and that the claim has

151. Weinberger, 412 U.S. at 633-34.
152. See Gilhooley, supra note 83, at 111-14.
153. Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 659-60 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
154. See Gilhooley, supra note 83, at 111-14 (suggesting that the FDA allow supplement marketers to make "research in progress" claims as a way to encourage high-quality
research programs).
155. A dramatic example in the case of drugs has been provided by the studies showing
that estrogen replacement therapy not only fails to provide many of the benefits thought
to exist but causes harm. Gina Kolata & Melody Peterson, Hormone Replacement Study
Shock to the Medical System, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2002, at Al. Compare Sally Squires,
What if the Big Fat Story Is Wrong?, WASH. POST., Aug. 27, 2002, at Fl (criticizing new
diet that ignores scientific research) with Gary Taubes, What if It's All Been a Big Fat
Lie?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 7, 2000, at 22 (questioning the role of carbohydrates and fat
in the diet).
156. See Gilhooley, supra note 83, at 112 (summarizing disclosures used on remand).
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not been accepted by most experts.157 A mere statement that the
FDA has not approved the claim could seem to reflect agency delay and inattention. Therefore, a disclaimer that affirmatively reflects the FDA's non-acceptance is more informative for consumers. The FDA's prior review of the disclaimers for the food claims
should occur, just as the Pearson court recognized was necessary
for disclaimers for the supplement claims.'58
E. Resources
Reviewing notifications for off-label uses and disclosures about
the off-label uses and for health claims, on a timely basis, places
considerable demands on FDA resources. The administration
needs to consider providing additional support to enable the FDA
to meet its added review and enforcement responsibilities under a
constitutional scheme that relies on disclaimers rather than premarket review to protect the public. Consideration should be
given to legislation that would have those seeking to make claims
based on disclaimers pay a fee to cover the added FDA staff costs
for enforcement. The model would be the "user fees" that must be
paid by those seeking approval of new drug applications, although the fee range would be different.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The FDA's request for comments on the impact of Western
States has put on the table the means of regulating food and drug
claims: whether simply providing information and disclaimers
about the lack of testing and FDA approval is sufficient, or
whether agency review of claims continues to be needed. The decision whether disclaimers supplant the need to obtain agency
approval for claims should not be made, however, on a simplistic
uniform basis. The determination of what is needed to protect the
public health and to meet the constitutional standards must be
made with respect to each type of regulatory program.
The agency made that request not simply to explore policy options but as a response to judicial developments that can put the

157.
158.

See id. at 112-13.
See Pearson, 164 F.3d at 659-61; see also Gilhooley, supra note 83, at 110-11.
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choice beyond the power of congressional decision. The immediate
impact of the agency's reconsideration of the policy will likely be
with respect to the position towards the manufacturer's promotion of off-label uses of drugs, direct-to-consumer advertising, and
health claims for foods. These are matters of major policy, and
their treatment can shape how other regulations are treated. The
re-examination now underway by the FDA will test the support
that pre-market approval has among health professionals and the
public, and how central a role Congress will play in determining
the protections provided to the public for food and drugs.
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